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EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE
Abstract
I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according
to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our
knowledge. This entails Williamson’s equation of knowledge with evidence.
1 Introduction
What is evidence? As is well known, Timothy Williamson (1997, 2000) argues that
S’s evidence is precisely what S knows. While we may regard this as a substan-
tive and necessarily true identity claim, akin to ‘water is H2O’, we should note that
Williamson’s argument is an a priori one. If it is a priori that evidence and knowledge
are one and the same, why do we have a concept of evidence at all?
I propose that we answer our initial question by posing another. What is the
purpose of evidence? Whereas knowledge may be intrinsically valuable, we do seek
evidence not for its own sake. Rather we want evidence because evidence will allow
us to draw conclusions in the course of enquiry. It is evidence that allows us to in-
fer that a theory is true or to know that a defendant is guilty. So evidence is sought
and is used for the purpose of making inferences. Indeed, most of the philosoph-
ical discussion of evidence concerns this feature, as for example we ask when will
evidence support an inference to a conclusion; the term ‘evidence’ is most natu-
rally used in the context of a proposition’s being ‘evidence for’ some proposition (or
sometimes ‘evidence against’ and other cognates). The significance of evidence for
the task of inference suggests an answer to our question, why do we have a distinct
concept of evidence: we have a concept of evidence in order to characterise certain
propositions functionally. Put in general terms, the concept of evidence serves to
characterize propositions in terms of their role in inference.
This paper looks at the relationship between evidence and inference in detail in
order to better understand what evidence is. I have two objectives:
(a) To articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evi-
dence: evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend
our knowledge.
(b) To provide an indirect argument for my characterisation by showing
that it entails Williamson’s claim that all and only knowledge is evidence,
for which he provides independent argument.
2 The concept of evidence characterised
The characterisation of the concept of evidence I propose is this:
(EC) p is in S’s evidence if and only S can gain knowledge by inference
from p.
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(EC) captures the intuition that evidence is what we infer from in order to get knowl-
edge; it acknowledges an asymmetry between evidence and what evidence is evi-
dence for. Yet the asymmetry afforded by (EC) is local not global. Given some par-
ticular inference, it is the ‘what is inferred from’ that is the evidence. (EC) is consis-
tent with its being the case that the knowledge inferred from evidence itself thereby
becomes evidence, evidence that can be used as the premise of some further infer-
ence.
(EC) is the conjunction of the two implications:
(EC→) if p is in S’s evidence then S can gain knowledge by inference from
p;
and:
(EC←) if S can gain knowledge by inference from p then p is in S’s evi-
dence.
I shall go on to give reasons why (EC→) and (EC←) provide accurate characteri-
sations of the concept of evidence. But first some clarifications.
In the above p must play a non-redundant role in the relevant inferences. Take
any knowledge-extending deductive inference: we can include p as a premise in
that argument, and indeed we can construct an argument in which p might appear
to play a role (e.g. using and-introduction followed by and-elimination). In such
cases p would be redundant, and (EC←) would not license inferring that p is in S’s
evidence. The concept of redundancy also extends to the components of p if p is
complex, e.g. a conjunction: the proposition (r∧s) would not be part of one’s evi-
dence just because one can gain knowledge by inference from r.1
We may consider a simple token inference as composed of three elements: (i)
a set of premises, (ii) an inference procedure, and (iii) a conclusion. Extended in-
ferences are concatenations of simple inferences. What we may call the epistemic
quality of a subject’s belief in a proposition p concerns whether subject knows p, or
has a justified belief in p that falls short of knowledge, or unjustifiably believes p.
Let us take the case where a subject’s belief in the conclusion comes about solely
as a result of the inference. In that case the epistemic quality of the belief will de-
pend on epistemic characteristics of the premises and of the inference procedure.
The relationship between the epistemic characteristics of the premises and the epis-
temic quality of the conclusion will be the focus of this essay and will be discussed at
length. Here I shall consider the epistemic characteristics of the inference procedure
so that we can set it aside.
The epistemic characteristics of the inference procedure will depend on a num-
ber of factors. Consider, for example, a subject carrying out a deductive inference.
The quality of the procedure will depend on formal features of the deduction—e.g.
whether it is valid. It will also depend on factors concerning the subject, e.g. whether
she is intellectually capable of entertaining the premises and conclusion, and that
she does not make errors in implementing the inference rule. If the inference proce-
dure is non-deductive, its quality will also depend on relevant features of the world.
Let us call an inference procedure faultless iff it it suffers from no shortcomings in
1I do not think that the notion of redundancy can be formalised. For example one might think that p
is a redundant premise in the set {Γ∪p} in a derivation of q if q can be derived from Γ alone (and Γ 0 p).
But it might be that any derivation from Γ alone is very different from the former (all such proofs might
be much longer). In such a case p would not be redundant in the sense relevant to the above principles,
and should be included amongst S’s evidence for q.
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its epistemic characteristics. A simple deductive procedure carried out carefully by
a competent logician will typically be faultless. Likewise, an electrician who infers
from the movement of the needle in a properly functioning ammeter that the battery
to which it is connected is not dead will typically be employing a faultless inference
procedure. A faultless inference procedure will be one that leads from true premises
to true conclusions. If one uses the procedure and reaches a false conclusion from
true premises because of the procedure, then the procedure suffers from an epis-
temic shortcoming. This means that the properties of being faulty and of being fault-
less are strongly externalist epistemic properties: a procedure might be faulty simply
in virtue of the way the world is: another procedure that is identical as regards the
subject may be faultless. While I do not claim to have characterised ‘faultless’ with
perfect precision, the notion does capture the intuitive idea that when an inference
leads us to a false conclusion, we may sometimes regard the inference procedure,
construed broadly so as to include external features of the world, to be at fault. In
this essay, we shall ignore such possibilities of epistemic fault in the inference pro-
cedure, in order to focus attention on the epistemic quality of the premises in an
inference.
While the epistemic characteristics of the premises and of the inference proce-
dure will be important in determining whether an inference gives the subject new
knowledge, they are not the only relevant factors. S might already know the conclu-
sion to be true, so S cannot gain any knowledge by the inference. Or S might have
strong evidence against q, so that it would be irrational to believe q despite this new
inference. We may regard a subject as receptive if she has no thoughts relevant to q
other than those employed in this inference.
We can now explicate the proposition (C) ‘S can gain knowledge by inference
from p’as it is used in (EC), (EC→), and (EC←). (C) is true precisely when it is possi-
ble for a receptive subject, S, as a consequence of some faultless inference procedure
from p, a non-redundant premise, to come to know the proposition that is the con-
clusion of the inference.
3 All evidence supports knowledge-producing infer-
ences
In this section I shall provide the argument for:
(EC→) if p is in S’s evidence then S can gain knowledge by inference from
p.
The idea behind (EC→) is that evidence has a sufficiently high-grade epistemic
status that a subject is capable of gaining knowledge by inference from it. (EC→)
contrasts with the claim that evidence might be epistemically low-grade and might
be incapable of supporting knowledge-producing inferences. Hence the clarifica-
tion of (EC→) in Section 2 excluded purely accidental reasons why a subject might
fail to produce knowledge from his evidence. A counterexample to (EC→) must be
one where a failure to produce knowledge must be attributable to the epistemic
weakness of the evidence.
Thus (EC→) would be false if either of the following were true:
(A) A receptive subject S infers q from evidence p by a faultless proce-
dure, but S’s resulting belief, q, is not justified.
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(B) A receptive subject S infers q from evidence p by a faultless proce-
dure, but S’s resulting belief, q, is not true.
That (A) is false is clear. It is at the very least the function of evidence to justify
our hypotheses. If a subject uses a faultless inference procedure to gain a new belief
from her evidence, then the new belief is justified.
The falsity of (B), although less immediately apparent, follows straightforwardly
if all evidence is true, since all propositions inferred by a faultless procedure from
true premises will be true, as was discussed above. One might wonder, however,
whether this claim about faultlessness is too strong. Might it not be sufficient for
faultlessness that it justify beliefs, without the additional requirement that the pro-
cedure is perfectly reliable? For example, the inference from ‘Jane has only one ticket
in a ten million ticket fair lottery’ to ‘Jane will not win the lottery’ might be thought
to employ a procedure that is not perfectly reliable but nonetheless justifies its con-
clusion. Should not such a procedure count as faultless in our sense? In the case
where Jane does win the lottery, may not the falsity of the conclusion be regarded as
epistemic bad luck external to the inference as opposed to a result of an epistemic
fault of inference? This is an issue that has been much discussed and cannot settled
here. It is my view as well as that of Nelkin (2000), Sutton (2007), et al. that in lot-
tery cases, a belief (on this evidence ) that Jane will not win is not justified. Such an
inference is faulty because its procedure is imperfectly reliable.
So if the evidence propositions are true, a faultless inference procedure will lead
to a true conclusion. But are all evidence propositions true? A central function of ev-
idence is the testing of hypotheses. In particular it is a requirement on any hypothe-
sis that to be credible it must be consistent with the evidence. Dick Heuer (1999: 47),
an intelligence analyst, states ‘A hypothesis may be disproved . . . by citing a single
item of evidence that is incompatible with it.’ A century and a half earlier, the legal
theorist Thomas Starkie (1834: 444) tell us ‘It is essential that all the facts should be
consistent with the hypothesis. For as all things which have happened were neces-
sarily congruous and consistent, it follows, that if any one established fact be wholly
irreconcilable with the hypothesis, the latter cannot be true. Such an incongruity
and inconsistency is sufficient to negative the hypothesis, even although it coincide
and agree with all the other facts and circumstances of the case to the minutest ex-
tent’ [emphasis as in the original]. Although Starkie uses the term ‘facts’, it is clear
from the context that he is talking about evidence; indeed this passage comes from a
section entitled ‘Circumstantial evidence’ in his book A Practical Treatise on the Law
of Evidence.
That all evidence is true is the best explanation of the requirement on any hy-
pothesis that to be credible it must be consistent with the evidence. If evidence
must be true, then this requirement excludes a set of propositions all of which must
be false. The requirement that hypotheses be consistent with the evidence would
lose its force if false propositions were among our evidence, for then perfectly true
propositions would be excluded as being inconsistent with our evidence.
A response to this argument suggests that the injunction that a hypothesis must
be consistent with the evidence is derived from the prohibition on believing contra-
dictions. If one permitted hypotheses inconsistent with the evidence one would be
permitting contradictions. But this response is inadequate, since the requirement
of consistency with evidence is stronger than the prohibition on contradictions. If
one is inclined to believe both of two propositions that contradict one another, the
prohibition on contradictions means that one cannot fully believe both. In order to
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fully believe either of the propositions, one will have to reject the other. The prohibi-
tion on contradictions does not say which to reject. It may be that further evidence
is required in order to decide between them. The requirement of consistency with
the evidence is stronger since it does tell us which of the two contradictory propo-
sitions to reject. If a hypothesis and the evidence contradict one another, then the
hypothesis is to be rejected. No further evidence is required. Of course, one may not
always know what one’s evidence is. In which case one might be in the position of
doubting that one’s evidence is indeed evidence when it conflicts with a favourite,
well-confirmed hypothesis. But it remains that case that if one did know in such a
case that one’s supposed evidence is indeed one’s evidence, then one would be able
to reject the hypothesis as false without further ado. This makes sense only if one’s
evidence is true. If one’s evidence is true, then what is reliably inferred from it is also
true. Hence (B) is false.
(That evidence is true makes it apparent that evidence must be conceived of
in an externalist fashion. I shall return to this in more detail in Section 6. For the
moment I shall reiterate that a strong conception of evidence is forced on us by the
principle ‘reject a hypothesis inconsistent with the evidence’. For example, we do
not accept the principle ‘reject a hypothesis inconsistent with what you believe’—
for it may be appropriate to drop the belief instead. Hence evidence must be more
than mere belief.)
Since (A) and (B) are false, we may conclude that evidence must be capable of
supporting inferences that yield beliefs that are both true and justified. We know
that not all true justified beliefs are knowledge. But it would be very odd if evidence
could support inferences to true justified beliefs but not to knowledge. Further-
more, Gettier cases typically arise because of reliance on justified but false lemmas.
But the falsity of (B) means that we can rule out false lemmas. So there is no rea-
son to suppose that evidence is capable of supporting inferences producing justi-
fied true beliefs without being able to support knowledge-producing inferences. We
may conclude that evidence is indeed capable of supporting knowledge-producing
inferences.
4 Propositions supportingknowledge-producing infer-
ences are evidence
In this section I shall discuss:
(EC←) if S can gain knowledge by inference from p then p is in S’s evi-
dence.
While (EC←) is a natural counterpart of (EC→) neither implies the other. (EC←)
can be true without requiring (EC→). One could deny that evidence must be capa-
ble of supporting knowledge-producing inferences, yet agree that if some inference
does produce knowledge, its premises must be among one’s evidence.
(EC←) asserts the epistemological significance of evidence. If (EC←) were false,
then there are propositions that are not evidence but from which one can nonethe-
less make knowledge-producing inferences. Thus to deny (EC←) would be to deny
the place given to evidence in epistemology. If (EC←) were false, it would be pos-
sible to gain knowledge by inferring from propositions not among our evidence, in
which case there would be no reason for us to care about which propositions are
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among our evidence. A criticism of S’s claim to know q may be made thus, “Propo-
sition q is not supported by your evidence!”. The falsity of (EC←) would permit S to
reply, “True, q is not supported by my evidence. But I did infer it from non-evidence
propositions that support knowledge-generating inferences.”
One might reject (EC←) while still giving evidence key role. This role would be
foundational. An inferred proposition may be thought of as standing at the near end
of a chain (or tree) of inferences. For the inferred proposition to be known the chain
of inference must start from evidence propositions. But the intermediate proposi-
tions need not count as evidence also (on this view). An adjustment to (EC←) that
encompasses this view would be:
(EC←)′ if S can gain knowledge by inference from p and p is not itself
known by inference then p is in S’s evidence.
According to the view of evidence just considered, inferred propositions cannot
count as evidence, whereas non-inferred propositions, such as propositions known
by direct perception, may so count. It should be noted that on this view, what counts
as evidence may be very vague. The theory-ladenness of perception means that it
will be unclear whether or not a known proposition should count as inferred or not.
For example, it seems as if the fact that a tomato is ripe can be known by direct
perception. But for some people, e.g. children, that the difference between ripe
and unripe tomatoes is a difference in colour may be a fact that is learned, and so
their knowledge that the tomato is ripe is inferred. As they become accustomed to
making this inference, it passes from a conscious to an unconscious process, and
until it would be inappropriate to call it an inference at all. So knowledge that the
tomato is ripe will be something that is non-inferential at one stage but is inferential
at a later stage. That some theory of a concept entails that it is vague is no objection
to that theory on its own. But this vagueness does suggest that evidence could not
play a central role in epistemology. Does it make a deep difference that in one case
the proposition that the tomato is ripe is inferred from its perceived redness (and
so is not evidence, according to (EC←)′ and in another case its ripeness is directly
perceived (in which case the proposition is evidence)?
More of a problem for (EC←)′ is the fact that evidence propositions can be for-
gotten. Let q be inferred from a proposition p that is evidence by the lights of (EC←)′.
Then r is inferred from q. We may imagine that all the propositions are known. Let
it be the case that between the first inference and the second inference the subject
forgets the proposition p, so when inferring r she has no longer has any knowledge
of p. According to (EC←)′ she has no evidence for r: her evidence cannot be p, since
she has forgotten p; nor can it be q, since q is inferred and is thus not knowledge.
That seems distinctly odd, since this subject certainly has a good reason for he be-
lief in r (viz. her knowledge of q), and it again undermines the idea that evidence is
epistemically significant. As Bird (2004) argues, this and other cases, show that the
restriction of evidence to non-inferential beliefs is implausible.2
To sum up the argument for (EC←): evidence is epistemologically significant;
inferences depending on premises that are not part of our evidence are flawed; in
particular they don’t lead to knowledge. If that were wrong, i.e. (EC←) is false, then
it becomes unclear why we care about evidence. If something else other than ev-
idence, call it ‘schmevidence’, could lead to knowledge, then it might be perfectly
2Bird in fact argues against the idea that evidence is restricted to non-inferential knowledge. His argu-
ments may be extended to the proposal that evidence is a any subset of non-inferred propositions.
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alright to ignore the evidence so long as one had enough schmevidence, since that
could be sufficient for us to expand our knowledge. But we don’t think that. The
rhetorical force of terms such as ‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ and ‘Evidence-Based
Policy’ is precisely that it is absurd to suggest that it is satisfactory to form beliefs on
the basis of anything other than evidence.3 I considered the response that we might
care about evidence nonetheless, if it is the ultimate source of premises for our in-
ferences, i.e. if evidence is not itself inferred. This proposal ignores the fact that
we generally do not remember the non-inferred propositions from which our in-
ferred knowledge ultimately derives. Nor is that failure to remember to be regarded
as a mere wrinkle, a departure from the ideal depicted by the theory. For our mem-
ories are designed not to store such information. Psychologists distinguish three
types of memory: perceptual memory, short-term memory, and long-term mem-
ory. What we learn non-inferentially, e.g. in perception, will enter the first and often
the second of these kinds of memory (whose duration is short) but only enter the
third if particularly significant. Long-term memory will store information we are
likely to use again, typically information we infer from what we perceive (or from
other knowledge) rather than the perceptual experiences themselves. Given the way
that memory works, evidence could not fulfil its epistemic role if it were restricted
to non-inferential knowledge—we just do not have enough non-inferential knowl-
edge to support, even in an ancestral way, the knowledge-generating inferences we
make. As I shall explain in Section 7, scientists do not use ‘evidence’ to refer only
to non-inferential beliefs or knowledge; for example, proponents of Evidence-Based
Medicine are not asking us to base clinical decisions on what we know through per-
ception but rather on the results of properly conducted randomized trials or meta-
analyses of such studies—such evidence is the outcome of sophisticated statistical
inference, doubly so in the cases of meta-analysis.4
5 Evidence and knowledge
The preceding sections articulated and defended the view, (EC), that p is in S’s ev-
idence if and only S can gain knowledge by inference from p. That completes my
first task, to provide a functional articulation of the concept of knowledge. In the
light of that account, we may ask: what must something be like in order to fulfil
that function? I shall defend the claim that all and only knowledge can fulfil this
function. So we may conclude that all and only knowledge is evidence. That is a
conclusion already reached by Williamson (1997). Since Williamson presented in-
dependent arguments for his conclusion, we may regard his arguments as providing
indirect support for (EC).
I claim that if (EC→) is true, then evidence itself cannot be less than knowledge:
(E→K) if p is in S’s evidence then S knows p.
The principle ‘no false lemmas’ states that an inference that depends non-
redundantly on a false premise cannot generate knowledge (Harman 1965: 92). The
principle can be extended. If an inference depends non-redundantly on a premise
3Which is not to say that the claims of, for example, the Evidence-Based Medicine movement are
trivial, because their claims also involve contentious assertions about what counts as good evidence in
medicine.
4A meta-analysis provides a statistical analysis of a set of several first-order studies thereby aiming for
a more robust result than any individual study provides.
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that is unjustified, then the conclusion of the inference will fail to be knowledge.
(This will be so whether justification is conceived of externally, for example in terms
of reliability, or internally, for example in terms of rules of rational belief-formation.)
When an inference depends on several premises non-redundantly, then a subject is
justified in believing the conclusion of the inference only if she is justified in believ-
ing all the premises (assuming that the subject has not other reason for believing
the conclusion). So in addition to the no false lemmas principle we may state a no
unjustified lemmas principle. Consequently, for an inference to generate knowl-
edge, its essential premises must be both true and justified. If the old JTB account
of knowledge were correct, then we could simply infer from the conjunction of the
two principles (no false lemmas and no unjustified lemmas), a third principle, no
unknown lemmas:
(NUL) S can gain knowledge by non-redundant inference from p only if
S knows p.
As it happens a Gettier belief (one that is true and justified, but does not amount
to knowledge) could satisfy no false lemmas and no unjustified lemmas without sat-
isfying no unknown lemmas. Nonetheless, the best explanation of why no false lem-
mas and no unjustified lemmas are correct principles is that they follow from the
more general principle, no unknown lemmas. There is nothing special about true
justified beliefs. If p is a Gettier belief, then we should not expect an inference that
depends on p to be knowledge generating. Typically p is a proposition that is acci-
dentally true, e.g. p = q∨r, where q is false but justified but r is true but unjustified.
But if p is accidentally true its truth cannot make any difference to the epistemic
quality of what is inferred from p. But since propositions inferred from false lem-
mas are not knowledge, neither then are propositions inferred from accidentally
true propositions. In the kind of Gettier case just mentioned, an inference from p
that yields a justified conclusion will depend essentially on the contribution of the
disjunct q of p (since only the disjunct q is justified). But in that case the inference
depends on a false lemma, and the conclusion is not knowledge. Hence an inference
from a premise which is a Gettier case of a justified true belief that is not knowledge
will not yield knowledge. Nothing short of a known premise will yield knowledge.
(In Section 6 I consider an objection to this claim.)
Having argued for ‘no unknown lemmas’, (NUL), we now note that this principle
plus (EC→) gives us that all evidence is knowledge, (E→K).
Hence, the left to right implication of (EC), (EC→), entails that all evidence is
knowledge. Correspondingly the right to left implication of (EC), (EC←), entails that
all knowledge is evidence, when conjoined with the highly plausible principle that
inference from knowledge is knowledge generating:
(KI) if S knows p then S can gain knowledge by inference from p;
(EC←) if S can gain knowledge by inference from p then p is in S’s evi-
dence;
therefore
(E←K) if S knows p then p is in S’s evidence.
(KI) is simply the idea that inference from what we already know has the power
to extend our knowledge. The phrase ‘can gain knowledge by inference from p then
p’ is still interpreted as discussed in Section 2, i.e. where the subject is receptive
to p and the inference procedure is faultless; so (KI) is not refuted by cases where
the subject has other beliefs relevant to the conclusion of the inference or where
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the inference is epistemically unsatisfactory. Under the intended interpretation, a
counterexample to (KI), would be a case where S comes to believe q as a result of an
inference from p where S knows p, yet S fails to come to know q because of some
inadequacy in the epistemic quality of p (and not because of some other facts about
S or facts about the inference procedure).
It is difficult to see how (KI) could be false: what more could be required of the
premise of an inference that aims at extending knowledge than that the premise
itself be known? However, the fact that (KI) looks sufficiently similar to the closure
principle for knowledge might make one think that someone such as Nozick (1981)
who rejects closure should reject (KI) as well. For alleged counterexamples to
closure claim that (known) valid inferences from known premises can sometimes
lead to conclusions that cannot be known—for example where the premise is a
known proposition about everyday circumstances (‘S is typing at a computer in a
university office’) and the conclusion is a consequences of that proposition that de-
nies some relevant sceptical scenario (‘S is not a brain-in-a-vat on a planet orbiting
Gamma Cephei being deceived into believing that she is typing at a computer in
a university office’). Are such cases, if we accept them, counterexamples to (KI)?
It is difficult to say with confidence that they are, precisely because it is difficult
to say what has gone wrong for the subject in such cases. For, prima facie, what
could be epistemically faulty about a valid inference that is furthermore known to
be valid? And the subject in such a case may unproblematically be assumed to be
receptive. That said, I think we can be confident that the fault cannot be laid at the
door of the premise of the subject’s inference. The counterexample posits that S
knows that she is typing as a computer in a university office. Could S’s epistemic
relation to the proposition that S is typing at a computer in a university office be of
any higher quality, such that a higher quality epistemic attitude to that proposition
would permit inferred knowledge that S is not a brain-in-a-vat on a planet orbiting
Gamma Cephei etc. . . . . Clearly not; this is not analogous to the case making an
inference from a premise that is false or unjustified; it is not that the premise is
epistemically not up to the task of supporting a knowledge-generating inference.
For that reason, I believe that a denier of closure must say that in some cases a
known valid inference can be epistemically faulty. The oddity in so saying is just
why many find it difficult to accept closure; but it is at this locus, on the inference
procedure, that the debate is centred. If so, then such counterexamples to closure,
even if accepted, need not be taken as counterexamples to (KI). For example, one
might argue, as some epistemic contextualists do, that closure is a correct principle
when restricted to a given context; what goes wrong in the counterexamples is
that there is a cross-context application of closure; such applications constitute
faulty inference procedures. In any case, the worst damage that a denial of clo-
sure could do to my argument is to require a modification to (KI) and the other
principles under discussion. For the closure denier does regard many inferences
as potentially knowledge extending, and so needs to supply some replacement for
closure. Whatever that replacement is, it will suggest an appropriate replacement
for (KI). Mutatis mutandis the arguments of this paper will stand. For example,
one modification would be to say that say that the ‘can gain knowledge’ in all the
principles applies only to cases where the conclusion, when true, is knowable at
all to S. The corresponding alteration to the central claim of this paper would be
that the function of evidence is to provide the premises of inferences that can
extend knowledge where knowledge is possible at all. Likewise, if one prefers a
contextualist approach, then the changes will require restriction to a given context,
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and the corresponding conclusion will give a contextualist account of evidence
(which is just what one would expect a contextualist to endorse). (I note that the
argument for (E←K) stands even if we have to have modify preceding arguments
to accommodate the denial of closure. If we adjust the interpretation of ‘can gain
knowledge’ that applies equally to (KI) and to (EC←), and so (E←K) still follows. If
we take a contextualist approach, then the same contextualist restrictions will apply
to what counts as evidence in (E←K) as applies to what counts as knowledge.)
In this section I have argued that the following are both correct:
(E→K) if p is in S’s evidence then S knows p.
(E←K) if S knows p then p is in S’s evidence.
which together entail:
(E↔K) p is in S’s evidence if and only S knows p.
If we combine (KI) with (NUL) we get the following extended ‘knowledge by infer-
ence’ principle:
(KI+) S can gain knowledge by inference from p if and only if S knows p.
Recalling:
(EC) p is in S’s evidence if and only S can gain knowledge by inference
from p.
(KI+) and (EC) directly give us:
(E↔K) p is in S’s evidence if and only S knows p.
In summary (where ‘⇒’ denotes entailment):
(NUL) ∧ (EC→) ⇒ (E→K)
∧ ∧ ∧
(KI) ∧ (EC←) ⇒ (E←K)
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
(KI+) ∧ (EC) ⇒ (E↔K)
The fact that (EC), along with the plausible (KI+), entails (E↔K) is indirect ev-
idence is favour of (EC). For Timothy Williamson (1997, 2000) has argued persua-
sively for (E↔K) on independent grounds. The grounds are independent since
Williamson’s arguments proceed principally on the basis of whether we would re-
gard certain propositions as part of a subject’ evidence, whereas the arguments
above concern principles concerning the function of evidence. In so doing those
arguments illuminate the concept of evidence in a way that Williamson’s arguments
do not (and are not intended to). There is no reason to suppose that ‘evidence’ and
‘knowledge’ are the really the same concept. If they were, one might ask, why do
we have a concept of evidence? Why don’t we make do just with the concept of
knowledge? We talk of ‘evidence for’ but not of ‘knowledge for’. We have a con-
cept of evidence distinct from that of knowledge to mark a special role for evidence.
Evidence is characterised functionally as that which supports knowledge-yielding
inferences. (KI+) tells us that it is knowledge that supports knowledge-yielding in-
ferences, which explains why Williamson’s equation is right.
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6 Knowledge inferred from premises that are not
known?
Above I articulated a principle, no unknown lemmas, which on the face of it is highly
plausible. It has, however, recently come under scrutiny with apparent counter-
examples. (NUL) is close to what Federico Luzzi (2010) calls ‘Knowledge Counter-
Closure’:
(KCC) if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduc-
tion from p and (ii) S knows q, then S knows p.
(NUL) was an extension of the No False Lemmas principle. Corresponding to the
latter is Truth Counter-Closure:
(TCC) if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduc-
tion from p and (ii) S knows q, then p is true.
I motivated the extension of No False Lemmas by arguing that one cannot gain
knowledge by non-redundant inference from a premise, if that premise is not jus-
tified. The latter principle may be called, No Unjustified Lemmas, and corresponds
to Justified Belief Counter-Closure:
(JBCC) if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent de-
duction from p and (ii) S knows q, then S is justified in believing p.
Luzzi (2010: 674–5) provides this case that claims to be a counterexample to
(KCC), and which would also be a counterexample to (NUL):
Agoraphobia Unbeknownst to Ingrid, her new and only housemate
Humphrey is something of an epistemic prankster. One evening, while
Ingrid is in the kitchen cooking dinner, Humphrey mischievously de-
cides to mislead her as to his whereabouts in the house. He there-
fore turns on the TV in the lounge so that she will believe, as she typ-
ically would, that he is in the lounge watching TV. However, also un-
beknownst to her, Humphrey is agoraphobic, and hence would leave
the house under very few circumstances; any circumstance in which
he would leave the house (e.g., because of a raging fire) is undoubtedly
one in which Ingrid would be aware that he is leaving the house. Sup-
pose that Humphrey subsequently momentarily forgets about his ploy
(something quite out of character for him), and accidentally wanders for
a few seconds back into the lounge. During that interval, Ingrid forms
the belief that Humphrey is in the lounge on the basis of hearing the TV
on by relying (whether implicitly or explicitly) on this inductive argu-
ment: ‘(A) The TV is on and I didn’t turn it on. (B) When this happens,
Humphrey is almost always in the lounge. So (1) Humphrey is in the
lounge’. She then carries out the following valid and sound deduction:
1. Humphrey is in the lounge.
2. If Humphrey is in the lounge, then Humphrey is in the
house.
Therefore,
3. Humphrey is in the house.
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Suppose, too, that Ingrid believes (3) via no other epistemic route.
Luzzi claims that Ingrid knows that Humphrey is in the house. However, she does
not know that he is in the lounge. So she has knowledge thanks to a deduction from
a premise she does not know to be true. So (KCC) is false and so is (NUL).
Why is it that Ingrid knows that Humphrey is in the house? Luzzi argues pri-
marily on the basis that we have a strong intuition here that Ingrid knows. But he
also points out that none of the normal reasons for rejecting beliefs as being knowl-
edge apply here, including the reasons we find for articulating why Gettier cases are
not cases of knowledge. In particular, Ingrid’s belief satisfies sensitivity—the nearest
possible world in which it is false that Humphrey is in the house (e.g. there is a fire) is
one in which she does not believe that he is in the house. And it satisfies safety—her
belief is true in all nearby possible worlds.
The fact that Humphrey is agoraphobic and that this is not known to Ingrid is
important. If Ingrid knew that Humphrey were agoraphobic, that knowledge would
provide an alternative route for Ingrid to reach the conclusion, and we could not
be sure that reflecting on this does not influence the intuition that she knows that
Humphrey is in the house. That Humphrey is agoraphobic is that makes Ingrid’s
belief that Humphrey is in the house satisfy the externalist considerations of sensi-
tivity and safety. For if he were not agoraphobic then there would be nearby worlds
in which he leaves the house, and in particular nearby worlds where he leaves the
house and in which she continues to believe that he is in the house.
As I shall now show, we are able to construct numerous cases that involve a single
premise deduction with premise p and conclusion q, where the subject believes q
(only) because of the deduction from p, the belief in q satisfies safety and sensitivity,
but the belief in p does not. Such cases ought to be good candidates as additional
counterexamples to (KCC) if Luzzi is right in his diagnosis of Agoraphobia.
Since q is true in all the worlds where p is true, q will be at least as safe as p. Con-
sequently, for an unsafe proposition one ought to be able to find a safe proposition
q that is deducible from p. Here are one case:
Complex tautology p is an unsafe proposition. S works out by the truth
table method that (p→ q) is a tautology. In fact this is because q is itself
a tautology, but this fact is not apparent to S. S believes q because q is
deduced from p.
In this case p is unsafe and so unknown. But q is safe—it is a tautology. Here is a case
with a contingent proposition in place of q:
Spurious precision Theory T predicts that the value of parameter ² is
8.1×10−12F /m. S measures the value of ² using a very reliable piece
of equipment, and gets the result ²= 8.85419×10−12F /m. So S believes
that ²= 8.85419×10−12F /m and deduces that T is false. It happens that
by chance the belief is true—although the equipment is reliable it is not
nearly as precise as the readout suggests; S is unaware that its limit of
precision is five significant digits.
S’s belief concerning the value of ² is unsafe. But the proposition deduced from this,
that T is false, may be a safe proposition.
That there can be pairs of such propositions playing the role of p and q in the
above seems clear. As a result it is very tempting to think that there ought to be cases
where p is not known, just because it is unsafe, and where q, being safe, is known.
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Now consider sensitivity. Where q is deducible from p, trivial cases excepted, q
will tend to be more sensitive than p. As above q will be true in a superset of the
possible worlds in which p is true, and so the closest possible world where p is false
will be closer than the closest possible world where q is true. By taking us to a more
distant possible world, the falsity of q is more likely to generate a world in which S’s
beliefs are different from those in the actual world. Consequently, it seems plausible
that there are many pairs of propositions p and q such that q is deducible from p
where p fails to be known on grounds of failing to satisfy the sensitivity requirement,
but where q does satisfy the sensitivity requirement and so succeeds in being known.
In the case of Complex tautology, belief in p might not satisfy sensitivity, whereas
belief in q does so trivially. In Spurious precision, it is a fluke that the equipment
gives the correct answer to this degree of precision; it would have given the same
result had the vale of² been slightly different, e.g. 8.85418×10−12F /m. So S’s belief
that ² = 8.85419×10−12F /m fails sensitivity. But the world might have been very
different had T been false, and so S’s belief in T would satisfy sensitivity.
Consequently, we can indeed construct cases were the belief in the premise of
a deduction does not satisfy safety and sensitivity but belief in the conclusion does
satisfy those conditions. It is tempting to think that such cases constitute counterex-
amples to (KCC) and (NUL). Nonetheless, I am not sure that we should yield to the
temptation to accept the plausibility of the forgoing reasoning. While it is true for
the above conditions that it is possible to find cases where p deductively entails q
and p fails the conditions and q satisfies it, it does not follow from this that there
are cases where p fails to be known for just that reason, and thus q succeeds in be-
ing known. That line of thought seems to rely upon the idea that knowledge is a
matter of meeting certain conditions, and that once all the conditions are met, the
proposition is known. But this just the view that is denied by Williamson.
It should be noted how easy it is to satisfy the conditions of sensitivity and safety.
The simpler versions of the safety principle make necessary truths trivially safe; they
also trivially satisfy sensitivity (some versions just decline to cover truths that are in
any way necessary). For the reasons given above, it is possible to find non-trivial (but
almost trivial) examples with contingent propositions. Consider propositions such
as “the Earth is more than 10,000 years old” or “atoms are composed of electrons,
protons, and neutrons”. Such propositions, being deeply tied to the history of the
world or the laws of nature, look to be true in all the closest possible worlds. In
particular, were those propositions false we human believers wouldn’t exist. So there
are no worlds in which I falsely believe either of those propositions.
Furthermore, although those conditions are used to avoid some Gettier cases,
I don’t think that they can avoid all. For if the propositions above satisfy the safety
and sensitivity conditions then their disjunction with some false but justified propo-
sition will also satisfy the conditions. Consider a late seventeenth century follower
of Newton who believes ‘F=ma or the Earth is more than 10,000 years old’. He be-
lieves this only because he believes the first disjunct, which is justified, but strictly
false for relativistic reasons. He doesn’t believe the second disjunct. His overall be-
lief is a true justified belief, but which is not knowledge. So it is a Gettier case. But is
also happens to satisfy sensitivity and safety.
Note that there are more subtle variants on this. Consider the following ‘F=ma
or Isaac Newton senior is the father of Sir Isaac Newton.’ Now imagine that this is
believed by some late seventeenth century follower of Newton just because they be-
lieve the first disjunct. In fact because of the some spurious scandal they mistakenly
deny the second disjunct. Consider the nearest possible world in which the propo-
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sition is true. That is one in which Isaac Newton senior does not have a son who
becomes the famous mathematician, Sir Isaac Newton. In that world Sir Isaac New-
ton does not exist. But we may suppose that in this world it was sometime after the
end of the seventeenth century that anyone proposed that ‘F=ma’. And so our sub-
ject, does not believe F=ma. Hence, the disjunctive proposition satisfies sensitivity,
and also safety.
Now we can return to Luzzi’s case. Luzzi suggests that if we deny that Ingrid
knows that Humphrey is in the house, then we are left with a new kind of Gettier
example. It is a new kind of Gettier because none of the normal diagnoses apply,
including sensitivity and safety. But as the above shows, some cases following an
entirely familiar pattern of Gettier case—ones formed by disjoining a false but justi-
fied belief with a true but unjustified belief—cannot be diagnosed as violating those
requirements.
Luzzi does also mention that Agoraphobia does not suffer from the no-false-
lemmas diagnosis of the failure of Gettier cases to be knowledge (while my Newton
cases do suffer from that analysis). Nonetheless, Agoraphobia is very close to be a
case where the no-false-lemmas principle does rule out knowledge. Imagine that
we retell the story slightly differently, so that Ingrid initial belief is “Humphrey is
watching the television” from which she infers that he is in the house. But, contin-
uing the story just as Luzzi does, Humphrey wanders back in to the lounge but not
to watch the television. In this case Ingrid’s inference will have started from a false
belief. But it seems implausible that whether Ingrid knows should depend on which
of these two propositions she believes at the beginning “Humphrey is in the lounge”
or “Humphrey is watching the television”. Both bear the same cognitive relationship
to Ingrid—believes them for the same reason (the sound of the TV) and they can
both play the same role in her inference to the conclusion that Humphrey is in the
house. If she starts with ‘Humphrey is watching the television” I think it is intuitively
clear that she does not know the conclusion of her inference, and so she does not
know if she starts with “Humphrey is in the lounge”. It seems a plausible principle
that if a belief fails to be knowledge because it fails the no-false-lemmas condition,
then it cannot be transformed into knowledge by replacing the false lemma by one
that is true but only accidentally so (i.e. a true lemma that bears a very similar cog-
nitive relationship to the subject). As I have argued above, the most coherent way of
articulating the thought that if one makes an inference with false premises or acci-
dentally true one, then the conclusion cannot be knowledge, is the fact that in each
case the premise fails to be knowledge. It may be claimed that what I am doing here
is wielding my principle (NUL) in order to re-interpret a potential counterexample
to (NUL) and that I am therefore begging the question. That isn’t quite what I intend.
Rather I suggest that insofar as Luzzi is appealing to intuitions to assert that Ingrid
knows, we can also elicit intuitions going in the opposite direction, that deny that
Ingrid knows. While these intuitions are best explained by (NUL), that fact is not
supposed to be part of they probative force of the intuitions. Consequently my con-
clusion is that the intuitions in favour of Luzzi’s reading are not sufficiently robust
to refute (NUL).
Some authors (Hilpinen 1988; Warfield 2005; Arnold 2011) claim to find cases
where knowledge can be gained by inferences from false propositions, thereby ap-
pearing to refute No False Lemmas also. Consider a case like Spurious precision
where the precise belief is false. Hilpinen argues that such a case is one where we
can gain knowledge by inference from a falsehood but notes also that in such cases
the false proposition is close the the truth. Plausibly therefore there is a nearby true
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proposition that the subject also believes or is disposed to believe and this can be
made to do the epistemic work of supporting a knowledge-producing inference (cf.
Coffman 2008). Warfield criticises this strategy for defending the requirement of
truth. The best versions of the strategy that Warfield considers are:
(S1) S has knowledge despite inferring from a falsehood if there is a jus-
tified and (at least) dispositionally believed truth entailed by the false-
hood that serves as the premise in the inference.
(S2) S has knowledge despite inferring from a falsehood if there is a jus-
tified and (at least) dispositionally believed truth evidentially supported
by the evidence for the involved falsehood.
Warfield points out that these strategies are defeated by the fact that they yield the
wrong answer in standard Gettier cases. I seem to see that there is a dog in the yard
(in fact it is only a toy) and infer that there is an animal in the yard. Unseen there
is a squirrel in the yard. In both cases the proposition ‘there is a dog or a squirrel in
the yard’ serves as the relevant justified and (at least) dispositionally believed truth,
and so both yield the conclusion that S knows, whereas this is a clear case of Gettier
non-knowledge.
The two strategies are bound to fail because they require the relevant proposi-
tion only to be true and justified, inviting us to chose a Gettier-style proposition;
propositions inferred from such propositions will not themselves be known. A nat-
ural requirement on the ‘replacement’ for the false proposition is one that is itself
known. The idea, a further strengthening of the approach of Coffman and Hilpinen,
is that where an apparent inference uses a premise that is false, the inferred proposi-
tion may still be knowledge if in the neighbourhood of the false proposition is a true
proposition that the subject knows, which the subject comes to know by a mecha-
nism similar to that by which the false proposition is believed, and which can sub-
stitute for the false proposition in an inference very similar to the one in question.
For short:
(SK) S has knowledge despite inferring from a falsehood if there is a cog-
nitively similar process leading to the same conclusion starting from a
proposition that S knows.
(SK) escapes Warfield’s Gettier response. It address cases like Spurious precision.
When S looks at the equipment and sees the display say that ² has the value
8.85419×10−12F /m, S believes, but does not know, that ² = 8.85419×10−12F /m;
S also believes, and does know, that ² is greater than 8.8×10−12F /m. In the kind
of case we are considering, S does not infer the second from the first; rather both
beliefs comes about as a direct result of seeing the display. From both beliefs S can
infer, in the same way, that the theory under test, T, is false.
One objection to this approach (and indeed to other approaches of the same
kind) is that it doesn’t really explain what needs explaining. We were wondering how
an inference from a false (or true but not known) proposition can lead to knowledge.
How does it help us understand this to show that a the subject could have engaged
in a different inference starting from a different premise? Furthermore, does not
this strategy just amount to admitting that there are counterexamples to (KCC) and
(NUL)?
This objection assumes a misleading conception of the cognitive psychology of
inference that is a consequence of the way that philosophers represent inferences.
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We represent inferences as sequences of precise propositions related by precise in-
ference rules—which for many purposes is a useful and revealing thing to do. If that
were also a correct representation of the cognitive psychology of inference, then it
would be correct to say that S actually made this inference but didn’t in fact make
this very similar inference. Yet, the psychology of inference is a much coarser, less
precise matter. I pick up a PhD thesis in order to judge how long it will take me
to read it; I conclude that it will take me more than two days. Which propositions
formed the basis of this inference? That the thesis clearly has many more than 50,000
words? That it probably has more than 70,000 words? That it looks longer than most
theses I have read? It does not appear correct to say that it is this one of these propo-
sitions, but not the others, that I used in my inference. More plausibly I make all
of these judgments and all play some role in influencing my conclusion. I conjec-
ture that, recognising this, we understand that although some inferences may be
represented in a precise way as starting from a proposition that is not known, this is
misleading, especially in the case of inferences starting from beliefs acquire by per-
ception. We understand in such cases the psychological reality is that there are other
propositions that we do know and that are also involved in the cognitive process of
inference and that the presence and role of these can suffice to lead to knowledge
of the inferred proposition (or propositions). Of course, such a picture means that
there will be considerable vagueness about when an inference process really does
involved known premises in the right way. But that seems to be no more vagueness
than we actually encounter in such cases, and may explain why cases such as Luzzi’s
are contentious.
7 Evidence and science
The conception of evidence advanced by (EC) tells us that to achieve the status of
evidence a proposition must be capable of supporting inferences that deliver knowl-
edge; furthermore any proposition that is so capable counts as among the subject’s
evidence. The latter tells us that evidential propositions are not restricted by con-
tent nor by the means by which they come to be believed. The proposal thus rejects
a conception of evidence that might appeal to certain empiricists, whereby evidence
propositions must concern what a subject perceives or observes. I mentioned and
rejected another conception of evidence that would appeal to some empiricists (and
perhaps some non-empiricist foundationalists), viz. that evidence is restricted to
propositions that are not themselves inferred from other propositions. Instead any
proposition, including propositions that may have been inferred from other propo-
sitions and including propositions that may be quite removed from perception, may
serve as an evidence proposition so long as it is capable of supporting knowledge-
generating inferences. In the light of (KI+), we see that the propositions that fulfil
this role are precisely the propositions that constitute the subject’s knowledge.
It is worth noting that the use of ‘evidence’ in science accords with the concep-
tion promoted here rather better than with the empiricist view(s) of evidence. Part of
the evidence for Einstein’s general theory of relativity is the anomalous precession of
the perihelion of Mercury. The precession is inferred from many individual obser-
vations of Mercury and thatinference involves considerable mathematical work as
well as substantive auxiliary hypotheses. Secondly, the precession is not perceptible.
So this standard use of ‘evidence’ in science does not accord with an empiricist view,
but does with the inferentialist conception.
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It is nonetheless true that the precession of Mercury is often referred to by sci-
entists as an ‘observation’. This shows only that the scientists’ conception of obser-
vation is one that is only remotely linked to perception. Historically, observation
has typically been heavily perceptual, but even then it has rarely been exclusively
perceptual. An astronomical observation may involve looking at a planet through a
telescope, but the key information in the recorded observation will include the ele-
vation of the telescope, its geographical location, and the time at which the planet
was seen, which are not perceived through the telescope, and in the case of time,
not perceptible at all (even if one has a watch). Likewise observations by nineteenth
century chemists and physicists recorded values of variables such as temperature
and electric current, which cannot be perceived. Positivists may argue that the real
observations are perceptions of the instruments. Even so, it remains true that the
use of even perceptual reports need to be given context, which is not obviously per-
ceptual: is what did the observer did to to avoid a parallax error something that is
itself perceptible by her? The empiricist proposal to limit ‘observation’ to perceptual
encounters is a revision to our use of the term ‘observation’. Observation in modern
science is even less perceptual and more heavily theory-laden. The Higgs boson has
been observed, but no one has perceived it; nor indeed has anyone seen its trail on
a cloud chamber photograph. Rather a vast array of different kinds of detectors, all
designed in a theory-intensive way, are connected to a computer which delivered its
results in a statistical form. In less esoteric science, modern radio telescopy delivers
nothing of significance that is perceptible, but rather the evidence is in the form of
data collected in a computer, which, furthermore, has been processed by statisti-
cal software. The same goes for the evidence that is used in constructing weather
models, which is collected and processed automatically.
Furthermore, if the evidence is strong enough for the physicists to conclude that
the Higgs exists, then its existence become a fact that itself is evidence that can be
used as required, for example in confirming the standard model of particle physics.
This illustrates the import of (E←K) and of (EC←). What makes something evidence
is not that it was produced in some specific way, but rather that it can be used for
a certain purpose: making knowledge-producing inferences. Correspondingly what
scientists care about when they consider whether a proposition (such as an asser-
tion that the precession of the perihelion of Mercury is 5557 seconds of arc per cen-
tury, or that the Higgs boson exists) counts as evidence is not what general kind of
source (perception, observation, inference form theory) produced the proposition,
but whether the particular process that produced it warrants that proposition suf-
ficiently that it can be relied upon in making further inferences. I have argued that
such warrant is sufficient only if it is enough to make the proposition in question
known.
8 Conclusion
At the outset I gave myself two objectives: (a) to articulate a functional characterisa-
tion of the concept of evidence that relates to inference; (b) to relate my characteri-
sation to Timothy Williamson’s claim that all and only knowledge is evidence.
The guiding idea behind (a) is that evidence is something we want for a purpose.
We don’t collect evidence for its own sake, but in order to make inferences from it
(e.g. concerning the truth of a hypothesis). Of course we can make inferences from
any old propositions and beliefs. But not just any old proposition or belief is ev-
17
idence. We want evidence for epistemically worthwhile inferences, the ones that
produce knowledge: evidence is that from which knowledge-producing inferences
can be made.
This conception allows any proposition to be evidence, so long as one can in-
fer knowledge from it. This stands in contrast to a conception of evidence as that
from which inference ultimately starts: evidence must be non-inferential. The in-
adequacies of this view of evidence were exposed by considering the possibilities of
forgetting one’s evidence or having it undermined by further evidence.
The conception of evidence as that which supports knowledge-producing infer-
ences entails that all and only knowledge is evidence. This equation of knowledge
and evidence is the conclusion reached by Timothy Williamson. My account and
his are mutually supporting: mine provides an account of the concept of evidence,
his provides a substantive identity concerning evidence. The idea that belief aims
at knowledge is implicit in Williamson’s epistemology (but not explicitly argued for).
The initial intuition I employed concerning evidence is that we want evidence for a
purpose: to make inferences from that evidence, inferences whose conclusions we
can believe. Therefore, if belief aims at knowledge, then what we want from evidence
is that it will permit knowledge-producing inferences.
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